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1. Introduction
Formation of the Euro area raises new questions about the coordination
of monetary and fiscal policy. Twelve countries—each with its own tax
and spending policies—are now married by a common monetary policy.
Does the common monetary policy have the same effect in each of the
countries, and the same implications for fiscal policy? Or, does it affect
high debt countries in a different way than low debt countries? Does it
favor big countries over small countries? And, how does the existence
of 12 separate fiscal policies affect the European Central Bank's (ECB)
ability to control inflation? In particular, is the lack of coordination of
national fiscal policies a major source of the rather surprising diversity
of national inflation rates we have observed since the Euro's inception?
And, is the consequent diversity of national real interest rates a source of
macroeconomic instability? If so, does this point to a need for constraints
on deficits, as embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)? Or, does
the SGP itself create a new source of instability at the national level?
In this paper, we try to address these questions within the context of
the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS).
1 The NNS is characterized by
optimizing agents and some form of nominal inertia. Thus, the NNS
provides a natural framework to study the interactions between mon-
etary and fiscal policy: its neoclassical underpinnings allow us to ana-
lyze the positive and normative implications of distortionary taxation,
while its assumption of nominal inertia allows us to assess the impli-
cations of these microeconomic aspects of fiscal policy for macroeco-
nomic stability.
The NNS has been used extensively to analyze monetary policy.
2 Inte-
grating fiscal policy has however been slow. There have been papers242 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
analyzing the theory of optimal monetary and fiscal policy,
3 but quan-
titative analyses are scarce.
4 There is, of course, a reason for this. It has
been difficult to make NNS models replicate stylized facts about fiscal
policy, facts that are taken from the recent empirical literature. We will
discuss some potential problems with our current modeling effort, and
it should be admitted at the outset that these problems may be driving
some of our results. In this sense, we view our paper as the beginning
of a research agenda, and not as the final word on policy coordination
within a monetary union.
We do not attempt a serious calibration to any particular country;
instead, we calibrate a series of models that seem to capture impor-
tant aspects of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in the
Euro area. An empirical investigation of the relationship between the
aggregate Euro area inflation rate and national inflation rates, and vari-
ous aspects of fiscal policy within the Euro area, suggests that we cali-
brate our model to an "Average" (small) Country, a High Debt Country,
and a Large Country. Then, we ask how the common monetary policy
impinges on national fiscal policy and national welfare in each of these
"countries," and how uncoordinated national fiscal policies impinge on
the ECB's ability to control inflation. We show that the common mon-
etary policy has asymmetric effects on the three countries: the effects
differ between the Average Country and the High Debt Country (not
too surprisingly) because the latter's fiscal position is more sensitive to
changes in debt payments, and the effects differ between the Average
Country and the Large Country (perhaps more surprisingly) because
the latter's inflation rate is more highly correlated with aggregate Euro
area inflation.
It may be best to summarize our basic results for the coordination of
monetary and fiscal policy at the outset:
• Productivity shocks and idiosyncratic monetary policy shocks
explain 70 percent of the volatility in the deficit-to-GDP ratio in our
Average and Large Countries, and 80 percent in our High Debt Coun-
try. Rules (like the SGP) that try to discipline fiscal policy by requiring
governments to limit the unconditional standard deviation of the debt-
to-GDP ratio seem rather perverse in this context.
• Productivity shocks are the dominant source of inflation differentials
in all versions of our model, followed by idiosyncratic monetary pol-
icy shocks. Shocks to tax rates and spending play a minor role. TheseMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 243
results are not changed by the inclusion of 'rule of thumb' consumers
(which augments the effect of fiscal shocks on aggregate demand). The
large inflation differentials observed in the Euro area do not, accord-
ing to our models, point to the need for coordination of national fiscal
policies.
• Our model suggests that if constraints on deficits are deemed neces-
sary in the Euro area, then there are advantages to doing so by requir-
ing that government purchases, rather than the wage tax rate, respond
to the deficit. In fact, our model suggests that such a constraint may
actually be welfare enhancing, since government spending crowds out
private consumption in our model. But as we discuss below, this result
may be driven by problematic features of our model.
• Deficits are more sensitive to interest rates in high debt countries,
due to the burden of debt service. In addition, high debt countries tend
to have higher tax rates, increasing tax distortions, and making tax rev-
enues more sensitive to changes in the tax base. Not surprisingly, these
factors lead to welfare costs: the typical household in our High Debt
Country would be willing give up 1.3 percent of its consumption each
period to live in the Average Country.
• Our model suggests that the common monetary policy favors larger
countries in the Euro area, since their inflation rates are more highly
correlated with aggregate (Euro area) inflation. For example, the wel-
fare cost of business cycles in our Average Country is four times larger
than in our Large Country.
As noted earlier, some of these results may be driven by potential
weaknesses in our NNS modeling. In particular, the role played by
productivity shocks appears to be excessive in our models. And, an
increase in government purchases crowds out private consumption; this
is inconsistent with empirical work by Fatas and Mihov (2000, 2001),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002).
In an attempt to address the consumption paradox, and to enhance the
role of demand side shocks, we add "rule of thumb" consumers in the
last section of the paper. However, this experiment in NNS modeling
does not change any of our basic conclusions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section,
we outline our basic NNS frame-work and explain how we calculate
national welfare; then, we present an empirical analysis that documents244 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
various aspects of fiscal policy in the Euro area and how movements in
national inflation rates affect the aggregate Euro area inflation rate; and
finally, on the basis of this empirical analysis, we calibrate our model
for an Average Country, a High Debt Country and a Large Country. In
the third section, we provide an overview of the performance of each
version of the model, focusing especially on the role of productivity
shocks. In the fourth section, we explain why the common monetary
policy has asymmetric affects across the Euro area, and we discuss the
ways in which it impinges upon national fiscal policy and welfare.
Some people believe that constraints on the size of deficits are neces-
sary in a monetary union; so, in the fifth section, we discuss rules for
the wage tax or government spending which limit fluctuations in the
deficit to GDP ratio; we assess their positive and normative effects. In
the sixth section, we discuss the ways in which fiscal policy impinges
on the ECB's ability to control inflation across the Euro area, and the
possible need for fiscal constraint to control inflation differentials across
the Euro area; we also discuss some anomalies in the way changes gov-
ernment purchases affect private consumption and investment. In the
seventh section, we introduce "rule of thumb" agents to try to address
some of those anomalies. The eighth section concludes with a discus-
sion of future research.
2. A Model of Euro Area Economies
We begin in Section 2.1 with a description of the basic theoretical frame-
work. In Section 2.2, we provide an empirical analysis of national infla-
tion differentials, and of national tax and spending policies. We draw
on this empirical work to calibrate a benchmark model to our three
typical country profiles: a typical small country, a typical high debt
country and a typical large country. In the remainder of the paper, we
use the model to discuss the interaction between monetary and fiscal
policy in the Euro area.
2.1 The Theoretical Framework
Like other NNS models, our model is characterized by optimizing agents,
monopolistic competition, and nominal inertia. Our basic framework is
most closely related to those in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and
Collard and Delias (2003): as in Collard and Delias (2003), we allow for
capital accumulation, and we calculate second order approximations toMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 245
both the model and the welfare function; as in Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000), we allow for both wage and price inertia. Our framework
differs from theirs in that we introduce distortionary taxation (on con-
sumption and labor income) and debt dynamics.
2.1.1 Firms' Price Setting Behavior
There is a continuum of firms—indexed by/—on the unit interval. At
time t, each firm rents capital KM(/) at the rate Rt, hires a labor bundle
Nt(f) at the rate Wt, and produces a differentiated product
5
where 0 < v < 1, and Zt is an economy wide productivity shock that
follows an autoregressive process -log(Zf) = plog(Zf _x) + £ t. The firm's
cost minimization problem implies
Rt/Wt = [v/(l - v)](Nt{f)/KtJf)), (2)












can be used as either a consumption good or capital. The good's price,






and demand for the product of firm/is given by
Following Calvo (1983), firms set prices in staggered "contracts" of
random duration. In any period t, each firm gets to announce a new
price with probability (1 - a); otherwise, the old contract, and its price,
remains in effect. If firm/gets to announce a new contract in period t,
it chooses a new price P)(f) to maximize the value of its profit stream
over states of nature in which the new price is expected to hold:
^ (7)246 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
where TC(f) is the firm's total cost, p is the households' discount fac-
tor, and X is the households' marginal utility of nominal wealth (to be
defined below). The firm's first order condition is
P; = w(PBt/PAt), (8)
where n = (p /(<p -1) is a monopoly markup factor, and
PBt = E^{a^-
tXjMCj{f)P^Yj = apEtPBt+1
PA — F V (fYRV~
t2 pwy — r/flF PA + 1 P^Y ("l(Tl
As a —> 0, all firms reset their prices each period (the flexible price case),
and P](f) —>nMCt(f). Since the markup is positive (ju > 1), output will
be inefficiently low in the flexible price solution.
2.1.2 Households' Wage Setting Behavior and Capital Accumulation
There is a continuum of households indexed by h on the unit interval.
Each household supplies a differentiated labor service to all of the firms
in the economy. The composite labor bundle
Nt= \\Uh)W°dh\ , cpw>l, (11)
reflects the firms' production technology. Cost minimization implies
that the bundle's wage is
, (12)
and demand for the labor of household h is
The utility of household h is
Ut(h) = £t|;^-
f[log(CT(/z)) - (l + xYXihf+'l (14)
where Ct(h) is household consumption of the composite good, and the
second term on the RHS of (14) reflects the household's disutility of
work.
6 The household's budget constraint isMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 247
Et[Att+1BM(h)] + Pt[(l + rc,t)Ct(h) + It(h) + Tt) (15)
= Bt(h) + (l-rw,M(h)L
dt(h) + RtKt^(h) + Dt(h)
where the first term on the LHS is a portfolio of contingent claims; Jf
is the household's investment in capital; Tt represents lump sum taxes
and transfers; T t and Twt are the tax rates on consumption and labor,
and the last three terms on the RHS are the household's wage, rental
and dividend income. The household's capital accumulation is gov-
erned by
Kt(h) = (1-8) K^h) + Iffi) - V2V Wt(h)/ KtJh)) - $\
2 Kt_, (h), (16)
where S is the depreciation rate, and the last term is the cost of adjust-
ing the capital stock.
Household h maximizes utility, (14), subject to its budget constraint,
(15), its labor demand curve, (13), and its capital accumulation con-
straint, (16). We begin with the wage setting decision. Following Calvo
(1983), households set wages in staggered "contracts" of random dura-
tion. In any period t, each household gets to announce a new wage with
probability (1 - co); otherwise, the old contract, and its wage, remains
in effect.
If household h gets to announce a new contract in period t, it chooses
the new wage
(17)
where juw = <pw/((pw - 1) is a monopoly markup factor, and
WBt = E^icopy-'N^W^
1^ = G)PEtWBt+1 + N^W^
1^, (18)
WAt = E^^ll-v,)^^ (19)
H
= copEtWAt+1 + (l-T^)A(NfV\T,
where X. is the household's marginal utility of nominal wealth (to
be defined below). As co ->0, all households get to reset their wages
each period (the flexible wage case), and Vft(h) = (iwNt
z/ Xt; that is, the
wage is a markup over the (dollar value of the) marginal disutility of
work. Since the markup is positive (nw > 1), the labor supplied will248 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
be inefficiently low in the flexible wage solution. Note that 1 /% is the
Frisch (or constant Xt) elasticity of labor supply.
When wages are sticky (co > 0), wage rates will generally differ across
households, and firms will demand more labor from households charg-
ing lower wages. Our model is inherently one of heterogeneous agents,
but complete contingent claims markets imply that all households have
the same marginal utility of wealth, X; this makes households identical
in terms of their consumption and investment decisions. In equilibrium,
aggregate consumption is equal to household consumption, Ct = Ct(h);
the same is true of the aggregate capital stock, KM = Ktl(h). So, we can
write the equilibrium versions of the households' first order conditions





where Xt and £f are the Lagrangian multipliers for the households' bud-
get and capital accumulation constraints, and if is the return on a "risk
free" bond.
2.1.3 The Aggregate Price and Wage Levels, Aggregate
Employment and Aggregate Output
The aggregate price level can be written as
(24)
;=0
since the law of large numbers implies that (1 - a)a' is the fraction of
firms that set their prices t-j periods ago, and have not gotten to reset
them since. It is straightforward to show that
Similarly, the aggregate wage (defined by equation (12)) can be written
asMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 249
In Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004), we showed that aggregate
output can be written as
Yt = Z^N^/DP^ (27)
where Nt = ^Q Nt(f)df is aggregate employment, Ktl = Fo Ktl(h)dh is the aggregate capital stock, and DPt = j
1Q(Pt/Pt(f))
<l>Pdf is a measure of the
price dispersion across firms; DPt can be written as
DPt = (1 - a)(Pt/P)(f)r + a (Pt/Pt_^DP^ (28)
The inefficiency due to price dispersion can be seen in equation
(27). Each firm has the same marginal cost (equation (3)); so, consum-
ers should choose equal amounts of the firms' products to maximize
the consumption good aggregator (4). If prices are flexible (a = 0), then
Pt{f) = Pt for all/, and this efficiency condition will be met; if prices are
sticky (a > 0), then product prices will differ, and consumption deci-
sions will be distorted. This distortion is manifested in equation (27).
If prices are flexible, DPt = 1 and aggregate output is maximized for a
given labor input; if prices are sticky, DPf > 1, and output will be less
for a given labor input.
2.1.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The ECB sets the interest rate for the Euro area in response to move-
ments in the aggregate (Euro area) inflation rate:
it = -log(0 + fcr,, (29)
where 7Ct is aggregate inflation, and 6 measures the strength of the
ECB's response to aggregate inflation. In Section 2.2, we explain how
Kt is related to national inflation, and in Section 4, we will see that the
Euro area's common monetary policy, (29), leads to asymmetries in the
effects of a common monetary policy on national economies.






 TRt ~ *c£t ~ VW/W, (30)
where Dt is the (end of period) real government debt, itl(Ptl/Pt)Dtl is real payment on last period's debt, Gt is real government purchases, TRt
is real government transfers, r tCt is the real consumption tax revenue,
and rwt(Wt/Pt)Nt is the real wage tax revenue. The real budget surplus is:
+ Gt + TRt]. (31)250 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
In the benchmark models, the logarithm of government purchases is an
auto-regressive process:
log(Gt ) = {l-pg) log(G) + pg log(G(_1) + egA, (32)
where bars over variables signify steady state values. The logarithm of
government transfers respond to the level of last period's debt:
t) = (l-ptr)log(TR) + PfrlogCT^) (33)
+ pJlog(D)-log(Df_1 )] + £,,,
where the response of transfers to debt—pd—ensures fiscal solvency.
7
In the benchmark models, the tax rates also follow auto-regressive pro-
cesses:
*c.t = (1 - Prc K + PTC*c,t-l + £Tc.t' (34)
?zv,t = (1 - PTW )
fw + Przv^zv.t-l + £vw,t' (35)
In later sections, we will allow for alternative specifications of tax
and spending rules.
2.1.5 National Welfare
Our measure of national welfare is
[log(CT)-(l + Z)-
1ALT], (36)
where C((= J 0 Ct(h)dh = Cfh) for all h) is per capita consumption, and
ALt = I QLt(h)
1+xdh is the average disutility of work. If wages are flexible
(o) = 0), then Wt(h) = Wt for all h, and firms hire the same hours of work
from each household; ALt = \%(h)
1+*dh = Lt(h)
1+% Po dh = Lt(h)
l+z. In this
special case, households are identical, and our measure of welfare, Ut,
reduces to individual household utility.
If wages are sticky (co > 0), then there is a dispersion of wages that
makes firms hire different hours of work from each household. This cre-
ates an inefficiency similar to the inefficiency due to price dispersion:




—will not be maximized for a given aggregate labor input \
lJ^t{h)dh.
This distortion in firms' hiring decisions manifests itself in the AL term
in equation (36). In Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004), we showed
that
ALt = Nt
u*DWt (37)Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 251
DWt=(l- co)(Wf* (h)/Wt y




where DWt = j
lQ (Wt(h)Wt)~'
piv/iUx}dh is a measure of wage dispersion,
analogous to DPt for prices.
2.1.6 Making Welfare Comparisons with Lucas's (2004)
Consumption Costs
Let Vt be the value function for aggregate welfare in period t. In light of
(36), Vt is given by
Vt = log(Q - (1 + xY
lALt + PEt[VtJ. (39)
In what follows, we will calculate second order approximations of Vt
to make various welfare comparisons. We calculate conditional wel-
fare, for any given parameters, by evaluating the value function at the
deterministic steady state, and denote this value as VQ. For example, let
country A—with a value function denoted by Vt(A)—be an economy
with nominal inertia characterized by (a, Q)) = (.67, .75), and let country
B—with value function Vt(B)—be a similar economy, but with no nomi-
nal inertia ((a, co) = (0, 0)). Then, the difference—V0(B) - V0(A)—can be
thought of as the welfare cost of nominal inertia.
Following Lucas (2003), we can interpret VQ(B) - VQ(A) as something
that has comprehensible units. In Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004),
we showed that VQ(B) - V0{A) is the percentage of consumption house-
holds in economy A would on average be willing to give up each period,
holding their work effort constant, to obtain the flexible wage/price values
of consumption and work effort in economy B. V0(B) - V0(A) is Lucas's
consumption cost of nominal inertia. In a similar vein, we can make
welfare comparisons between high and low debt countries, or big and
small countries, in terms of consumption costs.
2.2 Three Parameterizations of the Model
We do not attempt a detailed calibration of any particular country;
instead, we calibrate our model to represent prototypical countries
in the Euro area. For reasons that will become clear, we choose three
separate parameterizations for monetary and fiscal policy: one for an
"Average Country," a second for a "High Debt Country," and the third
for a "Large Country." In the first part of this section, we present data
on several fiscal measures, and report on some analysis that we use to
set the parameters in our fiscal policy rules. In the second part of this252 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
section, we examine data on Euro area inflation rates. The ECB sets a
single monetary policy based on Euro area inflation; so, the relation-
ship between the Euro area inflation rate and the national inflation rates
plays a potentially important role in the transmission of monetary pol-
icy to individual countries.
2.2.1 Fiscal Policy Indicators in the Euro Area Countries
To solve our model numerically, we need steady state values and param-
eters describing the dynamics and volatilities of five fiscal measures:
the ratios of debt, government purchases, and government transfers
to GDP, and the average tax rates on labor income and consumption.
Table 1 presents averages computed over a sample of 1996-2001 for
these five fiscal indicators.
The data summarized in Table 1 suggests two types of countries; a
country with an average level of debt in the 60-70 percent of GDP range
and a country with a high level of debt in the 100-120 percent of GDP
range. In our numerical analysis, we assume that the Average Coun-
try's debt is 70 percent of GDP, while the High Debt Country's debt is
100 percent of GDP. (The Large Country discussed in Section 2.2.2 is
Table 1
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considered to be a low debt country; it has the same fiscal parameters
as the Average Country.)
We assume that both the Average Country and the High Debt Coun-
try have government purchases (government consumption and fixed
investment) of 22 percent of GDP. We set the average tax rates on labor
income and consumption to be 35 percent and 15 percent respectively
for the average country.
The government's budget must be balanced in the steady state of
our model. Because our model is missing some sources of revenue, and
since the Euro area countries did not run balanced budgets during this
sample, we need to set the steady state level of at least one of our fis-
cal variables at a value that differs from the data in Table 1. Although
we have distortionary taxes in the model, we will see that government
transfers do very little. We therefore chose to let transfers deviate from
the data. We set them at about seven percent of GDP for our Average
Country; this achieves a balanced budget in the steady state. The high
debt country's budget must also be balanced in the steady state. Coun-
tries with high debt also tend to have high tax rates, so we set the aver-
age tax rates on labor income and consumption to be 40 percent and 17
percent respectively in the High Debt country; we set transfers to be 10
percent of GDP to balance the budget in the steady state.
We assume that both government spending and government trans-
fers can be described by autoregressive processes. First we HP filter
purchases and transfers (both deflated by the GDP deflator); then we
estimate first order autoregressions using a sample of 1975-2001. For
(the log of) government purchases, we find that 0.75 in annual data,
which corresponds to 0.93 in quarterly data, is a representative value
for the autoregressive coefficient and that 0.015 is a representative value
for the volatility of the (quarterly) innovation. For (the log of) transfers,
we find that 0.67 in annual data, which corresponds to 0.90 in quarterly
data, is a representative value for the autoregressive coefficient and
that 0.019 is a representative value for the volatility of the (quarterly)
innovation.
As noted in section 2.1.4, we need to make the primary budget sur-
plus react to the level of debt to insure that the government's present
value budget constraint holds. Again, in an attempt to set our fiscal
rules in a way that is consistent with the data, we add the lagged ratio
of debt to GDP to our autoregressions for purchases and transfers.
8 We
find evidence that both purchases and transfers react. For each variable,
the coefficient on the lagged ratio of debt to GDP is negative for ten of254 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
the 11 Euro area countries for which we have data. The coefficient in
the regressions using purchases is statistically significantly negative for
seven of the 11 countries and the coefficient in the regressions using
transfers is significantly negative for six of the 11. We have solved the
model both ways, assuming that purchases react to debt or assuming
that transfers react to debt, and we find that the results are broadly
similar; we report only the latter results. We find that 0.1 is a representa-
tive value for the response of (the log of) transfers to the lagged ratio of
debt to GDP, and we use that value in our numerical solutions.
Shocks to tax rates, like shocks to government purchases and trans-
fers, are persistent, but they are much less volatile. We estimate autore-
gressions for the two average tax rates and find that 0.66 and 0.52 are
representative values for autoregressive coefficients in the annual data
(corresponding to 0.90 and 0.85 in quarterly data). The innovations
have volatilities of only 0.0048 for the wage tax rate and 0.0038 for the
consumption tax rate. These are less than a third of the volatilities of
government purchases and transfers. We also added the lagged value
of the ratio of debt to GDP to the autoregressions, as well as measures
of the output gap and /or the ratio of the budget surplus (overall and
primary) to GDP, but we found no systematic evidence that the aver-
age tax rates react to any of these variables. The signs of the coefficients
were mixed and very few were statistically significant.
9
2.2.2 National and Euro Area Inflation
As discussed in section 2.1.4, we assume that the ECB implements mon-
etary policy by setting the interest rate in response to Euro area wide
inflation. Shocks that cause inflation in any single country will induce
a response by the ECB only to the extent that the country's inflation is
correlated with Euro area wide inflation. Similarly, movements in Euro
area wide inflation that are unrelated to the inflation rate in an individ-
ual country will result in a reaction by the ECB, and the resulting move-
ment in interest rates will be a monetary policy shock to that country.
1
0
To summarize the relationship between the Euro area inflation rate
and country specific inflation rates, we regress aggregate inflation on
national inflation:
K = 07Z+£ „ (39)
t c c,t nc,V ^ '
where ncl is inflation in country c and enct is the component of Euro
area inflation that is orthogonal to country c's inflation. The results,Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 255
which we report in Table 2, show a wide range of slope coefficients.
It is perhaps not surprising that the inflation rates of France and Ger-
many are more closely related to Euro area wide inflation than are the
inflation rates of the other countries—the slope coefficients are larger
and the volatilities of the innovations are smaller. Those two countries
are, after all, the largest in the Euro area. Because of this difference, we
will look at an average (small) country and a hypothetical large country
when we solve our model numerically. We will set 0. to 0.4 and Gm to
0.0028 for the Average Country, and we will set 0. to 0.75 and Gm to 0.002
for the Large Country.
Table 2













































































Inflation data are expressed as percent per quarter (inflation = 100*log(p/p( - 1)).
Sample is 1990:2 to 2004:1 except: Belgium 1991:2, Spain 1992:2, Luxembourg 1995:2.256 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
3. An Overview of the Model and the Role Played by Productivity
In this section, we provide an overview of the model, focusing on the
role played by productivity shocks. In the following sections, we dis-
cuss the ways in which monetary and fiscal policy impinge on each
other.
We used Dynare (see Juillard (2003)) to solve the model numeri-
cally. We used first order approximations to calculate the moments and
variance decompositions reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5, and to plot the
impulse response functions shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. The model
is calibrated to a quarterly frequency; variables are expressed as log-
arithms (except for interest rates); and all of the data have been HP
filtered. We used second order approximations of the value function,
(32), to calculate welfare: C is the cost of nominal inertia, expressed as
the percent of consumption an average household would be willing
to give up each period to obtain the flexible wage/price solutions for
consumption and work effort.
The results of the numerical solutions of the model are reported
in Tables 3, 4, and 5. These results are similar to those of the model
considered in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004), which captures
several important features of the data remarkably well. In particular,
that model generates volatilities of consumption, investment, output,
employment, and real wages that are very close to those found in the
U.S. data. In addition, it generates the kind of volatility that has been
observed in the efficiency gaps emphasized by Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000) and Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2002). And
like that model, our current model fails to match the data in some
potentially important ways. For example, Tables 3, 4, and 5 show that
inflation and output are negatively correlated in all three parameteriza-
tions of the model, whereas in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) we
show that inflation and output are positively correlated in the actual
data. Similarly, nominal interest rates and output are negatively cor-
related in the models, but positively correlated in the data. These facts
suggest the absence—or improper modeling—of traditional demand
side shocks.
1
1 In older Keynesian models, an increase in aggregate
demand (or shift of the IS curve) raises output and leads to inflationary
pressures, causing the central bank to increase the interest rate. Such a
demand shock would bring our model closer to matching the positive
correlations of output with inflation and the interest rate observed in
the data.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 257
Table 3
Average (small) county




























































































































































National Welfare: V = -18.17; C = -1.90%
Note: The data was generated by Dynare, using 1
s
t order approximations; all variables are
in logarithms, and have been HP-filtered. V is the intercept of a 2
n
d order approximation of
equation (32); C is the cost of nominal inertia, expressed as a percentage of consumption.258 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
Table 4
High debt county




























































































































































National Welfare: V = -19.46; Cost of nominal inertia = -1.90%; Does worse than Av co by 1.29%
Note: The data was generated by Dynare, using 1
s
t order approximations; all variables are
in logarithms, and have been HP-filtered. V is the intercept of a 2
n
d order approximation of
equation (32); C is the cost of nominal inertia, expressed as a percentage of consumption.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 259
Table 5
Large county




























































































































































National Welfare: V = -16.70; Cost of nominal inertia = -0.43%; Does better than Av co by 1.47%
Note: The data was generated by Dynare, using 1
s
t order approximations; all variables are
in logarithms, and have been HP-filtered. V is the intercept of a 2
n
d order approximation of
equation (32); C is the cost of nominal inertia, expressed as a percentage of consumption.260 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
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Average (small) country, productivity shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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Average (small) country, interest rate shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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Average (small) country, government purchases shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using l
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Average (small) country, labor tax shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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High debt country, interest rate shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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High debt country, government purchases shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
s
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High debt country, consumption tax shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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High debt country, labor tax shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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Large country, productivity shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
s
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Large country, interest rate shock
Note: Impulse response functions generated by Dynare, using 1
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Large country, consumption tax shock
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The variance decompositions in Tables 3, 4, and 5 tend to confirm
these suspicions. The productivity shock, e, explains 90 percent of the
variation in inflation, and over half of the variation in output. It is easy
to see (mechanically anyway) why productivity shocks play such an
important role in the volatility of inflation. Equation (8) implies that
new prices are driven by marginal cost, and equation (3) shows that
marginal cost can be written in terms of factor prices—R and W—and
productivity—Z. Wages are inertia ridden, and the rental rate on capital
plays a minor role since capital's share is small; so, productivity shocks
play the major role in driving marginal cost and inflation.
1
2 In fact,
we suspect productivity shocks play a disproportionate role in these
models—a theme that we will come back to repeatedly.
The impulse response functions in Figures 1 A, 2A, and 3A show how
a typical productivity shock propagates through the three versions of
the model. Beginning with the Average Country, a positive productivity
shock decreases marginal cost, causing new prices to fall. As national
inflation rates are positively correlated in the Euro area, the fall in
national inflation is associated with a decrease in Euro area inflation,
and the ECB decreases the interest rate. This causes consumption and
investment to rise, increasing output and employment. Turning to the
fiscal variables: lower interest rates decrease interest payments on the
debt (interest/GDP in the figures); higher levels of consumption and
employment increase the consumption and wage tax revenues (cons
tax rev/GDP and wage tax rev/GDP); total tax revenues (total rev/
GDP) - rise. All of these factors combine to lower the deficit (deficit/
GDP in the figures).
Turning to the High Debt Country, the basic story is much the same.
However, the fall in the interest rate has a bigger effect on interest /GDP
than in the Average Country, and deficit/GDP falls more. In the Large
Country, the ECB's monetary policy limits the fall in inflation (for rea-
sons discussed in Section III); so, the real interest rate falls more than
in the Average Country, and consumption, investment and output rise
more.
Productivity shocks play a very important role in the volatility of
the deficit to GDP ratio. From Tables 3, 4, and 5, productivity shocks
explain about 40 percent of the variation in deficit/GDP in the Aver-
age Country, 40 percent in the High Debt Country and 60 percent in
the Large Country.
1
3 Rules like the SGP try to discipline fiscal decision
making by forcing fiscal policy to limit the unconditional volatility of276 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
the deficit-to-GDP ratio. But, in this context, it seems perverse to make
fiscal policy offset the volatility in fiscal balances that is created by pro-
ductivity shocks; this volatility has nothing to do with a lack of fiscal
discipline. This is another theme we will come back to.
Tables 3, 4, and 5 also report some welfare results. Vo represents the
expected value of national welfare, conditional on state variables being
initially at their non-stochastic steady-state values. Vo is equal to -18.2
for the Average Country, -19.5 for the High Debt Country and -16.7 for
the Large Debt Country. As explained in Section 2.1.5, these welfare
differences can be interpreted as consumption equivalents: the typi-
cal household in the Average Country would be willing to give up 1.5
percent (= 18.2 - 16.7) of consumption each period to live in the Large
Country, and the typical household in the Average Country would have
to be given 1.3 percent (= 19.5 - 18.2) more consumption each period
to make it move to the High Debt Country. The tables also report the
consumption costs of nominal inertia in the three countries: 1.9 percent
in both the Average Country and the High Debt Country, and only 0.4
percent in the Large Country.
It is easy to understand why welfare is lower in the high debt coun-
try; it needs high distortionary tax rates to service its debt. The reason
why welfare is higher in the big country is less obvious: the ECB's inter-
est rate is more sensitive to movements in its inflation rate; we will
discuss this further in Section 4.
4. How Monetary Policy Impinges on National Fiscal Policy and
National Welfare
The ECB sets the interest rate for the entire Euro area, based upon move-
ments in aggregate (Euro area) inflation. Since national inflation rates
are not perfectly correlated with the aggregate inflation rate, the ECB's
policy is not symmetric across countries. In this section, we show where
the asymmetries come from, and how the ECB's policy affects national
fiscal policy and national welfare in small countries, in large countries
and in high debt countries.
The asymmetries in monetary policy work through two channels,
both of which derive from our projections of aggregate Euro area infla-
tion on national inflation (reported in Section 2.2). The ECB sets the
interest rate in response to movements in aggregate inflation:
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where nt is aggregate inflation. Our regressions project aggregate infla-
tion on national inflation:
*i = 0A,
 + <W (41)
where nct is inflation in country c. Substituting (41) into (40), the ECB's
policy can be expressed in terms of inflation in country c and an interest
rate shock:
t + eict, (42)
where e = Qe ,.
ic,t m,t
The first asymmetry in monetary policy is that the ECB does not
respond to national inflation in the same way for each country. Our
regressions show that # is much bigger in large countries than it is in
small countries. In our models, we set the ECB's 0 equal 2.7.
u In the
Large Country Model, we set 0 equal to 0.75. The Average Country and
the High Debt Country are assumed to be small countries, and we set
0 equal to 0.4 in those models. So, the ECB's response to inflation in the
Large Country Model is 00c = 2.025, while its response to inflation in the
other two models is only 00c = 1.08.
The second asymmetry in monetary policy is that the size of the
interest rate shock differs across countries. Our regressions show
that the standard deviation of £m t is much smaller in the large coun-
tries than it is in the small countries. We let the variance of f^in the
Large Country Model be half the size it takes in the other two models.
Note that the ECB's choice of 0 scales this shock up to what we call
the interest rate shock, e.f. The greater is the ECB's reaction to Euro
area inflation, the larger is the interest rate shock. This effect is
especially large for countries with large idiosyncratic inflation vari-
ance.
The two asymmetries help explain some of the welfare differences
reported at the end of Section 3. The typical household in the Average
Country and in the High Debt Country would be willing to give up 1.9
percent of consumption each period to be rid of wage and price inertia;
households in the Large Country would only give up 0.4 percent Part
of the difference is due to the fact that interest rate shocks are smaller
in the Large Country, and part is due to the fact that the ECB responds
more aggressively to inflation in the Large Country: in Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2005), we showed that increasing the response of
interest rates to inflation will—up to a point—decrease the consump-
tion cost of nominal inertia.
1
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The impulse response functions in Figures IB, 2B, and 3B show how a
typical interest rate shock propagates through the three versions of the
model. Beginning with the Average Country, the higher nominal inter-
est rate lowers inflation, and the real interest rate rises. Consumption,
investment and output fall, and employment falls. This decreases rev-
enue from both the consumption tax and the labor tax, and the higher
interest rate means higher interest payments on the debt. All of these
factors combine to raise the deficit-to-GDP ratio.
Turning to the High Debt Country, the basic story is once again much
the same. However, the fall in the interest rate has a bigger effect on
interest/GDP than in the Average Country, and deficit/GDP falls more.
In the Large Country, the size of a typical interest rate shock is smaller;
this alone diminishes the importance of the shocks. However, the Large
Country also benefits from the fact that ECB policy responds more vig-
orously to changes in its inflation rate. It limits the fall in inflation; so,
the real interest rate rises less than in the Average Country, and con-
sumption, investment and output fall less. Tax revenues fall less, and
deficit/GDP does not rise as much.
Interest rate shocks play a very important role in the volatility of the
deficit to GDP ratio, almost as important a role as productivity shocks,
as can be seen in the variance decompositions reported in Tables 3, 4,
and 5. As noted earlier, rules like the SGP try to discipline fiscal decision
making by forcing fiscal policy to limit the unconditional volatility of the
deficit to GDP ratio. But, in this context, it seems perverse to make fiscal
policy offset the volatility in fiscal balances that is created by monetary
policy; this volatility has nothing to do with a lack of fiscal discipline.
Put another way, all of the fiscal shocks combined—the shocks to
government purchases (e), government transfers (etr), consumption
tax rates (e ) and wage tax rates (e )—explain less than a third of the
variation in the deficit/GDP in any of the models. In the High Debt
Country—presumably the country to worry about—fiscal shocks only
explain 20 percent of the volatility in deficit/GDP. If all of the fiscal
shocks were eliminated, 80 percent of the volatility of deficit/GDP
would remain. We turn to the implications of this for deficit constraints
in the next section.
5. How Deficit Constraints Impinge on National Inflation and
Welfare
In Section 4, we discussed direct ways in which the ECB's monetary
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discuss an indirect way in which the monetary policy may impinge
on fiscal policy and welfare in the Euro area. In particular, it has been
argued that constraints on deficits are necessary for price stability in
a monetary union. Our results in Section 6 below do not provide a
rationale for this notion, and Canzoneri and Diba's (1999) survey of
the economic literature also found little support for it. Nevertheless, it




In this section, we compare fiscal policy rules in which either spend-
ing or tax rates respond to movements in the budget deficit. Although
the questions we raise are motivated by the SGP, we do not explicitly
consider a deficit ceiling of three percent of GDP. Instead, we consider
rules for fiscal policy that reduce the volatility of the deficit (relative to
GDP) by adjusting tax rates or spending in response to movements in
deficit/GDP; this lowers the probability of hitting any particular ceil-
ing. In part this choice is motivated by the fact that, in the steady state
of our model, output does not grow and inflation is zero; so, a three
percent ceiling would be quite different in our model than in the econo-
mies of the Euro area.
1
7 And in part, this is a pragmatic choice dictated
by our inability to solve the model subject to inequality constraints.
We consider rules in which either the tax rate on labor income or
government purchases adjusts in response to anticipated budget defi-
cits.
1
8 We assume that the legislative process is too sluggish for the fis-
cal authorities to react to deficit/GDP within the quarter, and that they
determine purchases and tax rates one period in advance. The wage tax
rate is now given by:
i eTWill (43)
and government purchases are given by:
\Og(Gt) = (l-pg)log(G) + pg\og(Gt_1) + ggEt^St/Yt) + egJ. (44)
As in the previous sections, we set the steady state value of fw to 0.40
and set G so that the steady state ratio of government purchases to out-
put is 0.22 with p = 0.93.
In what follows, we use either gw or gg to reduce the standard devia-
tion of deficit/GDP from 0.0146 to 0.01. Under either of these policies,
the probability that the deficit will exceed 2 percent of GDP falls from
more than 17 percent to less than 5 percent. Table 6 summarizes the
impact of these fiscal rules on the High Debt Country.
1
9 The effects of
either rule can be best understood by considering how the economy280 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
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1. Results for economic variables are unconditional standard deviation, in percentages.
2. Results for welfare are in consumption equivalents, in percentages.
responds to the shocks to productivity and the interest rate, since they
are the dominant sources of fluctuations in our models.
Consider the case in which the wage tax rule is used to stabilize
deficit/GDP; as before, g is set equal to zero. A negative productiv-
ity shock will reduce output and consumption, although by less than
would be the case if wages and prices were flexible. Labor income also
falls along with consumption, so that tax revenues decline and defi-
cit/GDP rises. If the wage tax rate rises in response, consumption and
output fall by more.
2
0 Consequently, output and consumption volatility
increase. Inflation volatility rises only slightly.
A positive interest rate shock will also reduce consumption, output,
and labor income. The resulting increase in deficit/GDP will induce
an increase in the wage tax rate, bringing about a further decline in
consumption and employment. This will increase the volatility of both
consumption and employment.
If instead the government purchases rule is used to stabilize deficit/
GDP (and gw is reset at zero), the volatilities of output and employment
increase, but consumption and inflation volatility fall. Following a neg-
ative productivity shock or a positive interest rate shock, the decline in
purchases causes output and employment to fall by more than they did
with the wage tax rule. The decline in purchases crowds in consump-
tion, however, and consumption falls by less. Consumption volatilityMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 281
is considerably lower when the government purchases rule is used to
stabilize deficit/GDP.
The economy is subject to distortions from the consumption and
wage taxes, from market power on the part of firms and workers, and
from the nominal rigidities. As a result, interpreting welfare effects is
not straightforward. The interaction of our tax and spending rules with
these distortions may play a role in determining the effects on welfare.
Welfare falls by about a half a percent of consumption when the wage
tax rule is used to stabilize deficit/GDP. On the one hand, this is not
surprising—inducing greater volatility in tax rates is generally thought
to reduce welfare (Barro (1979)). On the other hand, following a nega-
tive productivity shock, nominal rigidities keep consumption from fall-
ing as much as it would with flexible wages and prices. The response
of the wage tax rate reduces consumption further, and this might be
thought to offset some of the effects of the nominal rigidities. This is an
example of the interaction between distortions in our model that might
complicate the welfare effects. It turns out however that, following a
negative productivity shock, the rise in the wage tax rate makes con-
sumption fall even more than it would with flexible wages and prices,
and consumption is farther away from its flexible wage/price value.
The response does not, in fact, mitigate the distortions arising from
sticky wages and prices.
In contrast, welfare rises by about a half a percent of consumption
when government purchases are used to stabilize deficit/GDP. This
welfare effect is consistent with the intuition derived from a model with
flexible wages and prices. By crowding in consumption, following a
negative productivity shock or a positive interest rate shock, and by
crowding out consumption following a positive productivity shock or
a negative interest rate shock, the response of government purchases
to deficit /GDP greatly reduces the volatility of consumption, thereby
providing a kind of insurance to consumers. The steady state values of
consumption and government purchases are, of course, unaffected by
the response. But by reducing consumption when it is above its steady
state value—when the marginal utility of consumption is low—and
raising it when the consumption is below its steady state value—when
the marginal utility of consumption is high—rule for government pur-
chases actually raises welfare.
Our finding that deficit constraints can be welfare enhancing—when
done properly, with a rule for government purchases—will undoubt-
ably be controversial. And indeed, we think that the result should be282 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
viewed with caution, for at least two reasons. First, government pur-
chases are purely wasteful in our models. They do not enter utility
functions, and they play no role in the production technology. If govern-
ment purchases were to be given a more meaningful role in our models,
then making them fluctuate with deficit/GDP would probably incur a
welfare cost. Second, the welfare gains described above come—at least
in part—from the fact that an increase in government purchases crowds
out consumption in our models. The empirical literature, although far
from unanimous, suggests that the response of consumption to a shock
to purchases is positive.
2
1 If instead, an increase in purchases lead to in
an increase in consumption, then requiring purchases that respond to
deficit/GDP would reduce consumption when it is low and raise con-
sumption when it is high, adding to the volatility of consumption and
reducing welfare.
6. Does Fiscal Policy Impinge on the ECB's Ability to Control
National Inflation?
The ECB's primary concern is with stability of the aggregate (Euro
area) inflation rate, and it seems to be doing well in that regard. How-
ever, the diversity of national inflation rates has been rather surprising,
and as we have seen, the consequent diversity of real interest rates can
affect macroeconomic stability at the national level. Can the diversity
of national inflation rates be attributed to the diversity of national fis-
cal policies? If so, there might be an argument in favor of coordinating
fiscal policies through the kind of deficit constraints that are embodied
in the SGP.
Duarte and Wolman (2002) provided a tentative answer to this ques-
tion. They developed an NNS model with two symmetric countries,
and with stochastic processes for productivity and government pur-
chases. They calibrated their model to German data, and solved it with
and without the government spending shocks. They found that the
productivity shocks alone were sufficient to explain the standard devia-
tion of the inflation differential that has been observed for France and
Germany; moreover, they found that adding the government spend-
ing shocks hardly changed the standard deviation. The diversity of
national fiscal policies did not appear to impinge on monetary policy's
ability—or lack thereof—to control national inflation rates.
Our model has features that Duarte and Wolman's model does not: it
has a consumption tax, in addition to the labor tax; it has shocks to theMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 283
processes for tax rates and government transfers, in addition to shocks
for government purchases; more generally, it has wage inertia, in addi-
tion to price inertia; they have capital; and it allows for asymmetries
due to country size and the level of the debt. In this sense, our model is
richer than Duarte and Wolman's;
2
2 on the other hand, Duarte and Wol-
man's model has the advantage of being a general equilibrium model,
while ours is partial equilibrium. In any case, the additional features in
our model may imply that instability in tax and spending policies have
a greater impact on national inflation rates.
However, our results confirm Duarte and Wolman's. This can be
seen in the variance decompositions (Tables 3, 4, and 5): all of the fis-
cal shocks combined—the shocks to government purchases (e), gov-
ernment transfers (str), consumption tax rates (ej and wage tax rates
(ej)—explain well less than 10 percent of the variation in inflation in
any of the models. It is largest for the Average Country: 7.4 percent. For
the High Debt and Large Countries, it is far less: 2.6 percent and 1.9
percent, respectively.
By contrast, productivity shocks explain 90 percent of the variation in
inflation in all three versions of our model. One of the reasons for this
was already discussed in Section 3: new prices (of firms lucky enough
to be able to reset them) depend upon marginal cost, and productivity
feeds directly into marginal cost. We also noted that inflation and out-
put are negatively correlated in the model, but positively correlated in
the actual data. This suggests the absence of—or the lack of importance
of—traditional demand side shocks.
One possibility is that the tax and spending processes we have mod-
eled are propagating in a different way in the model than they are in the
actual data. In the rest of this section, we investigate the way in which
our tax and spending shocks affect aggregate demand and inflation.
We do this using the remaining impulse response functions pictured in
Figures 1, 2, and 3.
We begin with the shock to government purchases (and Figures
1C, 2C, and 3C). In the Average Country, an increase in government
purchases increases both GDP and inflation. As such, shocks to gov-
ernment purchases are a potential source of the positive correlation
between output and inflation observed in the data. But, the shock does
not affect the components of aggregate demand in ways that might
be expected. What is expected? In traditional Keynesian models, and
in VARs reported by Fatas and Mihov (2000, 2001), Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002), an increase284 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
in government purchases boosts private consumption spending
and crowds out investment. In our Average Country, a government
purchases shock boosts investment (at least initially) and crowds out
consumption.
The rather perverse effect on investment seems to come from mon-
etary policy. As explained in Section 4, the ECB's response to national
inflation is weak in small countries, and it allows the real interest rate to
fall in response to government purchases shock. In the Large Country,
where the ECB's response to national inflation is strong, both consump-
tion and investment are crowded out.
The perverse effect on consumption illustrates the Ricardian tenden-
cies that remain in these models. Households work more, and consume
less, in response to an increase in government purchases, as in the RBC
models that preceded the NNS paradigm. Transfer payments have no
effect on consumption at all. Adding nominal inertia or distortionary
taxation does not change these facts. In the next section, we try to break
up these remaining Ricardian influences by adding "rule of thumb"
consumers.
The effects of an increase in government purchases on the fiscal
variables are perhaps what one might expect. The higher interest rate
increases interest/GDP; the higher employment increases wage tax/
GDP, but the lower consumption spending decreases cons tax/GDP,
and total rev/GDP falls; the net effect is an increase in deficit/GDP. All
three countries show the same effects.
Moving to the shock to the consumption tax rate (and Figures ID,
2D, and 3D), results are once again what one might expect. In the Aver-
age Country, a tax increase lowers consumption and output, and also
inflation. Like the shock to government purchases, a consumption tax
shock produces a positive correlation between inflation and output.
The ECB responds to the lower inflation by cutting the interest rate;
this decreases interest/GDP and causes investment to fall. Employ-
ment falls, curtailing revenue from the wage tax. However, this is out-
weighed by increase in consumption tax revenue and the decrease in
interest payments, and deficit/GDP falls. In the High Debt Country, the
story is much the same. In the Large Country, the ECB responds more
vigorously to the fall in inflation. Consequently, interest/GDP rises
more, and deficit/GDP falls more.
Moving finally to the shock to the wage tax (and Figures IE, 2E and
3E), results may be a little more surprising. In the Average Country, a
tax hike decreases work effort and output, and increases inflation. AMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 285
wage tax increase is a supply side shock—like the productivity shock—
which results in a negative correlation between inflation and output.
The ECB responds to the higher inflation by raising the interest rate;
this increases interest/GDP and causes investment to fall. The increase
in wage tax revenue exceeds the decrease in consumption tax revenue,
and deficit/GDP falls, despite the increase in interest payments. The
story is largely the same in the other two countries.
7. Adding Rule of Thumb Consumers
Our NNS model with optimizing (forward-looking) households sug-
gests a very limited role for fiscal shocks. A number of recent contribu-
tions, however, point out that models with forward-looking households
may not yield empirically plausible implications about the effects of fis-
cal shocks. In particular, our NNS model shares an implication of the
RBC model highlighted in Fatas and Mihov (2001): in both models, an
increase in government purchases has a crowding out effect on con-
sumption. By contrast, as we note above, the empirical literature on the
effects of fiscal shocks (although far from being unanimous) suggests
that the response of consumption to a shock to government purchases
is positive.
In this section, following Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003), we
extend our model by introducing some households who have no assets
and simply consume their current disposable income. The introduction
of such households raises rather awkward theoretical questions and
modeling choices that we do not address in this paper.
2
3 In addition,
our extended model only addresses one particular aspect (the response
of consumption to a shock to purchases) of the challenges posed by the
empirical literature.
2
4 Nonetheless, the basic idea that some households
follow a rule of thumb seems to be viewed as a practical device in help-
ing New Keynesian models come closer to matching the data.
2
5
7.1 The Extended Model and Its Parameters
We assume that optimizing (O) households have unit mass and behave
as described in Section 2 previously. We need not change the equations
pertaining to these households, except for adding the subscript O to
the relevant variables. We also envision a group of low-income, liquid-
ity-constrained (L) households who have no assets and always con-
sume their current disposable income. For simplicity, we give these286 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
households unit mass as well, but assume they are homogeneous and
less productive than optimizing households. Specifically, the effective
labor input Nt entering the production function (1) above is
Nt = [£NO Z*-
1)/" + (1 - £)NL in-wi]nnn-vf n > 0, 0.5 < £< 1, (45)
where No t is the bundled labor input of O households (the CES aggre-
gate of their differentiated labor inputs, defined in Section 2), NL t is the
labor input of L households, and t, determines the relative productivi-
ties of the two types of labor.
To minimize costs, firms relate their demand for the two types of
labor to the CES wage index of O households (Wo t) and to the wages of
L households (WLf):
VoJ 0/u [(1 - 0/<n (46)
The CES wage index for the effective labor input Nt is:
Wt = [t? Wo;-" + (1 - 0" W^-" ]
1/(1" *> (47)
Given the new definitions of Nt and W( in (45) and (47), the other equa-
tions describing the behavior of firms (marginal cost, etc.) are the same
as the ones described in Section 2.
We assume (arbitrarily) that the wages of L households are propor-
tional to the aggregate wage of O households.
2
6 Specifically, we set
Wu/WOf = (l-0/£ (48)
This implies that hours in (46) equalize across the two types, and coincide
with aggregate hours. Moreover, given (48), the elasticity of substitution
7/ does not matter for the results we report below (we set r\ = 0.5 in our
numerical solutions of the model). We set £= 0.6 to make WLt = (2/3)WOf.
Since L households have no income from capital and receive no dividends,
their consumption share is lower than their share in labor income.
We assume L households receive a lump sum transfer from the gov-
ernment that we set to 10 percent of GDP. This raises their consump-
tion to just under 60 percent of the consumption of O households. We
assume that L households consume their entire disposable income
including the transfers (TRt) each period:
d
 + \t)







Since both groups of households have unit mass, aggregate consump-
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Ct = Cot + Cu, (50)
and, with the new definition of Cf, the goods market clearing condition
in Section 2 still applies.
The stock of real government debt (D) now evolves according to the
budget constraint
Vt = (1 + ij VJ% + G, + TRt - xcJt Ct - rW/t (Waf N04 + Wu NJ (51)
where rot is a lump sum tax levied on O households. The budget sur-
plus (inclusive of interest payments) is
A reasonable figure for total transfer payments in our benchmark econ-
omy would be about 18 percent of GDP, but some transfers (business
subsidies, pensions, etc.) do not seem to correspond to the transfers
from O households to L households in our model. We assume that the
relevant transfers in our benchmark country are 10 percent of GDP.
We retain our earlier assumptions about the benchmark country's con-
sumption tax (15 percent), wage tax (35 percent), share of government
purchases in GDP (22 percent) and debt-to-GDP ratio (70 percent). We
have added the lump-sum tax (of about 2.8 percent of GDP) paid by
O households to make the above figures consistent with a steady state
equilibrium in our model.
7.2 Quantitative Results
We continue to assume that transfer payments react to the debt-to-GDP
ratio to insure that the government's present value budget constraint
is satisfied. We start with a benchmark case in which transfers only
depend on lagged transfers and lagged debt/GDP. Figure 4 shows the
responses of CL t, Ct, and Yt to a one standard deviation shock to trans-
fers and to government purchases. Either shock increases the consump-
tion of L households sufficiently to increase aggregate consumption and
output.
2
7 The effect of transfers on output suggests, as we will explore
below, that counter cyclical transfers can serve as automatic stabilizers
in our model. The response of aggregate consumption to a shock to
government purchases is positive (but it is not as persistent as some
empirical studies find).288 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
Consumption of L Households Aggregate Consumption
Figure 4A
Model with non-optimizers, transfer shock
We turn next to the possibility that transfers are counter cyclical. In
regressions of the log of transfers on its own lagged value, the log of
the output gap, and debt/GDP, we do not find statistically significant
coefficients on the GDP gap (although our point estimates are nega-
tive for almost all the countries). However, when we estimate equations
without the debt variable, the coefficients on the gap are in most cases
negative and statistically significant.
In Table 7, we compare the numerical solution under our bench-
mark case, in which the elasticity of transfers with respect to the gap
is zero, to two alternatives: one in which the elasticity is -0.35 (our
estimate for France) and one in which it is -0.75 (our estimate for
Finland). Table 7 reports the standard deviation of various HP filtered
variables and the welfare loss (measured in consumption equivalents)
that O households suffer as we move from the benchmark to a given
alternative. Stronger counter cyclical transfers do appear to serve asMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 289
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Figure 4B
Model with non-optimizers, government purchases shock
automatic stabilizers in our model; they lead to lower variability
of aggregate consumption and output. This comes, however, at the
expense of higher consumption variability for optimizing households.
Our model suggests that the welfare losses of O households result-
ing from counter cyclical transfers are large; when we change the elas-
ticity of transfers with respect to the output gap from the benchmark
value of zero to -0.75, the welfare of O households drops by over 1.2
percent of their consumption. Since we don't have a welfare mea-
sure for L households, we can't assess their gain from counter cyclical
transfers.
As noted earlier, we found that the NNS model we used in Canzo-
neri, Cumby, and Diba (2004) matched several important features of
the data, but failed to match the positive correlations of output with
inflation and interest rates. We argued that this failure is likely due to
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Table 7
Standard deviations and welfare losses under alternative transfer schemes












Note: Standard deviations are for HP filtered variables in the model of Section 7; these
figures are calculated using the first order approximation to the model. In our benchmark
specification, the elasticity of transfers with respect to the output gap is zero. The alterna-
tive specifications set this elasticity to -0.35 and -0.75. The welfare losses of optimizing
households are expressed as percentages of their consumption, as we go from the bench-
mark to each alternative; these losses are calculated using the second order approxima-
tion to the model.
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005), we considered a shock to prefer-
ences that is often called an IS shock. We found the counterfactual pre-
dictions of the model remain, even when that shock is large. The current
model with rule of thumb consumers potentially amplifies the effects
of fiscal shocks and therefore represents another potential solution to
this problem. For the benchmark specification (in which transfers do
not respond to the output gap), the correlations of output with infla-
tion and the interest rate are -0.12 and -0.84, respectively. Although
these values are somewhat less counterfactual than those reported in
our earlier work, they are still far from the positive correlations found
in the data.
Tables 8A and 8B show the variance decompositions for two of the
specifications: the benchmark case (where transfers do not respond
to the output gap), and the case with an elasticity of -0.75. Although
we have given a more important role to fiscal shocks, they still fail to
account for a sizable fraction of the variability in output and inflation.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 291
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Our earlier finding that inflation is almost entirely driven by produc-
tivity shocks still applies—as does our query about whether or not this
result is an artifice of the NNS models we have examined. Moreover,
despite the introduction of rule of thumb consumers, fiscal shocks still
contribute less than 25 percent to the variance of the deficit to GDP
ratio when transfers do not respond to the gap, and less than 15 percent
when they do.292 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we calibrated an NNS model to three "typical" coun-
tries in the Euro area—an Average Country, a High Debt Country and
a Large Country model. Our model implies that productivity shocks
and monetary policy account for much more of the variability in defi-
cit/GDP than fiscal shocks do. In this sense, macroeconomic conditions
and the common monetary policy impinge on the ability of national
fiscal authorities to abide by the deficit limits of the SGP. By contrast,
our models suggest that fiscal shocks (of the magnitude we observe in
the Euro area) do not impinge on the ECB's ability to control inflation
and do not contribute in any significant way to differentials in national
inflation rates. The latter conclusion confirms the results of Duarte and
Wolman (2002), whose two country model lacked some of the richness
of our partial equilibrium models. Our analysis highlights the mechani-
cal origin of this result: inflation in NNS models is driven mostly by real
marginal cost, and real marginal cost is driven mostly by productivity
shocks.
Our views on policy questions tend to be shaped by what the current
generation of models suggests. The NNS is a vast improvement over
models that we have used for policy analysis in the past. Our mod-
els' implications (summarized in the Introduction) are for now our best
assessment of how monetary and fiscal policies interact in the Euro
area. However, we know that new models are—and should be—greeted
with a healthy dose of skepticism. Some of the current skepticism has
manifested itself in empirical challenges to the modeling of fiscal policy
in the NNS. In the remainder of this section, we discuss directions of
ongoing research, research that may well change our views about the
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy within the Euro area.
One empirical challenge comes from the consumption paradox we
have already discussed: an increase in government purchases crowds
out consumption in our models, but not in the VAR's of Fatas and Mihov
(2000, 2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2002). The robustness of this VAR result is the subject of ongoing
research—Perotti (2004) finds results vary substantially across coun-
tries and sample periods; moreover, it remains to be seen why the VAR
literature is contradicted by alternative approaches to the identification
of fiscal shocks. Settling this empirical question is particularly impor-
tant for our assessment of NNS models with forward looking agents.
However, our attempt to introduce rule of thumb consumers suggestsMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 293
that a "resolution" of the consumption paradox need not reverse our
conclusion that fiscal shocks contribute very little to the variability of
inflation, and are far from the most important source of variability in
deficit/GDP.
A second empirical challenge strikes at the nexus linking productivity,
real marginal cost, and inflation in NNS models. This nexus is probably
behind the counter cyclical movements of inflation and the nominal
interest rate in our models. Our rather rudimentary look at U.S. data in
earlier work suggested that inflation and interest rates are procyclical,
and the failure of our NNS models (here and elsewhere, see Canzo-
neri, Cumby, and Diba (2004, 2005)) on these fronts is rather striking.
It remains to be seen if our empirical claim is robust across countries
and sample periods, or whether it survives a more careful empirical
scrutiny. If it does, then an important challenge to NNS modelers will
be to construct models that yield procylical inflation and interest rates.
In Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005), we added an IS-type prefer-
ence shock, and here we have added "rule of thumb" consumers. Both
extensions move us in the right direction, but neither is strong enough
to change the sign of the correlations, or to overcome the dominant role
played by productivity shocks.
Notes
This paper was prepared for the NBER's ISOM in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 18-19, 2004.
1. Goodfriend and King (1997) outlined the New Neoclassical Synthesis, and gave it the
name. Woodford (2003) provides a masterful introduction to this class of models.
2. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003).
3. Examples include Benigno and Woodford (2003), Kollmann (2004), and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004a,b).
4. Duarte and Wolman (2002) is a notable example; we will discuss their work below.
5. Although the aggregate capital stock will be predetermined in our model, we are
assuming that capital is mobile across firms. Thus, in our notation, £,_,(/) stands for firm
/'s choice of its capital input at time t.
6. The utility function (and budget constraint below) should also include a term in real
money balances, but we follow much of the NNS literature in assuming that this term
is negligible. An interest rate rule characterizes monetary policy, so there is no need to
model money explicitly.
7. Using Woodford's (1995) terminology, this is how we make our fiscal regime "Ricard-
ian." Our choice to put the reaction to debt into the equation for transfers was partly
motivated by our empirical results. We found no significant or systematic reaction to debt
or deficit variables in our estimated equations for taxes. By contrast, we found strong and294 Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba
significant reactions to debt in our estimated equations for transfers and/or government
purchases for most countries. We put the response in transfers (which are lump sum) to
minimize the auxiliary effects on other variables.
8. As we discuss below, we do not find systematic evidence that either the average tax
rate on labor income or consumption reacts to the lagged ratio of debt to GDP.
9. We estimated both least squares regressions with lagged values and instrumental vari-
ables regressions with contemporaneous values.
10. Thus countries in the Euro area will be subject to monetary policy shocks even when
the interest rate rule itself contains no shock (as we have assumed here).
11. The strong negative correlation between interest rates and output remains when
set a = co=0, eliminating the nominal rigidities and therefore the effect of the demand
shocks.
12. In the Average Country Model, the correlation between inflation and (real) marginal
cost is 0.98, and productivity shocks explain 88 percent of the variation in (real) marginal
cost.
13. Productivity shocks move interest rates more in the Large Country Model since the
response of Euro area inflation to movements in national inflation is greater. This effect
will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.
14. This value is based on estimates of a "traditional Taylor rule" in Gerlach-Kristen
(2003). Other estimates of the response to inflation in Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and Surico
(2003a,b) are below unity. These values would raise determinacy issues in our model that
we do not address here.
15. King and Wolman (1999) showed that fixing the price level achieved the constrained
optimum in an NNS model characterized by price inertia, but Erceg, Henderson and
Levin (2000) that an inflation—output tradeoff arises when wage inertia is added. In Can-
zoneri, Cumby and Diba (2005), we used variants of the Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
model to show that there is an optimal value for 6 in a rule like (33); lowering the volatil-
ity of inflation beyond a certain point is welfare decreasing.
16. Some would argue that fiscal discipline is needed for reasons that are not directly
related to monetary policy.
17. One implication of having no steady-state output growth and inflation is that the
budget needs to be balanced in the steady state. This makes it exceedingly difficult to
relate any particular deficit to GDP ceiling in our model to the 3 percent ceiling in the
SGP.
18. We focus on the labor tax and government purchases because there appears to be
less movement in the average tax rate on consumption among the Euro area countries,
and because transfers have no significant effect in our model despite the introduction of
distortionary taxes.
19. Implications for the Average Country are similar, but some of the magnitudes differ.
20. The responses to tax and spending shocks are pictured in Figures 1,2, and 3, and will
be discussed in more detail in Section 6.
21. In particular, VARs reported by Fatas and Mihov (2000, 2001), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) find a positive response in U.S. data.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 295
Perotti (2004) finds mixed results and weaker evidence of a positive response after 1980
for the five countries he considers.
22. In addition, in the next section we will introduce some "rule of thumb" consumers in
order to amplify the effects of fiscal shocks.
23. We can neither specify an objective function for households who follow a rule of
thumb, nor articulate the features of the economic environment that lead to their postu-
lated behavior. A minimal attempt to make progress on these issues might involve fol-
lowing Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004) in modeling some myopic households who
maximize their period utility. Unfortunately, besides raising the potential indeterminacy
issues highlighted by Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004), such an approach would fail
to address the empirical challenges discussed in Fatas and Mihov (2001)—who trace the
challenges to the intratemporal labor-leisure decision of optimizing households, rather
than any intertemporal considerations.
24. In particular, our model does not address the issue, highlighted in Fatas and Mihov
(2001), of how real wages respond to a shock to government purchases.
25. In particular, the current generation of models developed at central banks, such as
Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2004), typically include rule of thumb consumers.
26. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003) and Erceg et al. also rely on ad hoc specifications
of how wages are determined.
27. As expected, the consumption of O households has a negative response (not shown)
to either shock. L households, however, have a higher marginal propensity to consume
out of current disposable income, and this leads to the increase in aggregate consumption
and output.
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Appendix
I. The Data
Df End-of-period stock of debt. Source: OECD. Gross debt is gross financial
liabilities of the general government sector (series GGFL) and net debt is net
financial liabilities of the general government sector (series GNFL). Net finan-
cial liabilities are equal to gross financial liabilities less the financial assets of
the general government sector. The composition of these assets varies across
countries and includes cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector, partici-
pations in private sector companies, holdings in public corporations, and for-
eign exchange reserves. The treatment of the liabilities of the pension plans of
government employees also differs across countries
Gf Government consumption + fixed investment during period t. Source:
OECD. Government consumption is series CG and government fixed invest-
ment is series IGAA.
Pt Harmonized consumer price index for the last month in quarter t. Source:
Eurostat (series ICP).
Trt Government transfer payments during period t. Source: OECD. Transfers
are computed as the sum of subsidies, social security payments paid by the
government, and other current payments by the government (series TSUB +
SSPG + TOCP). Transfers are also the difference between current disbursement
and the sum of government consumption and property income paid by the
government (series YPG - CG - YPEPG).
Yt GDP. Source: OECD (series GDP).
7tt Inflation rate from period t - 1 to period t. Computed as log(P(/P(:).
rwt Average tax rate on labor income. Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002), data
provided by David Carey.
T t Average tax rate on consumption. Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002), data
provided by David Carey.
II. Parameters Used in Calibration
cc. Firms reset prices each quarter with probability 1- a, so that the mean time
between price changes is (1 - a)~
l. Taylor (1999) surveys a large literature and
concludes, "price changes and wage changes have about the same average fre-
quency - about one year." This would suggest that we set a = 0.75. His con-
clusion is consistent with the results reported in Gali and Gertler (1999) and
Sbordone (2002). More recently, Begnino and Woodford (2003) state that surveyMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interact in the European Monetary Union 299
evidence suggests prices are set slightly less frequently than twice a year, which
would suggest using a value for a close to 0.5. Bils and Klenow (2004) report
evidence that consumer prices are adjusted on average considerably more fre-
quently than once a year. Like Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we set a - 0.67
so that prices are set on average once each three quarters. This value has the
advantage of lying between other values chosen in the literature and is consis-
tent with Blinder's (1994) survey evidence.
a: Workers reset wages each quarter with probability 1 - co, so that the mean
time between wage changes is (1 - co)'
1. We follow the evidence surveyed in
Taylor (1999) and set co = 0.75 so that wages are reset annually on average.
(p: We set the elasticity of substitution across goods, (p = 7, so that the markup
of price over marginal cost, ju = (p /((p -l)is about 17 percent. Estimates of the
markup reported in the literature vary across sectors from about 11 percent to
23 percent. See Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004). Although the evidence
suggests that the 15 percent markup used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
is a reasonable value for the U.S. manufacturing sector, the evidence cited in
Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti indicates that markups outside of manufacturing
are higher. As a result we selected a value in the middle of the range of values
in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti.
<pw: We set the elasticity of substitution across workers, <pw = 7, so that the wage
markup, fiw = q>J{(pw -1) is about 17 percent. This is based on evidence on inter-
industry wage differentials discussed in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004).
v: We set the capital share to be 0.25. Prices are set so that P = ju MC, and
marginal cost can be written as the ratio of wages to the marginal product of
labor. Thus P = jip[WN/(l - v)Y] and (1 - v) = }ip[WN/PY]. The labor share
of compensation (compensation of employees plus two-thirds of proprietors'
income relative to GDP - indirect business taxes) in U.S. data averaged about
two-thirds between 1960:1-2003:2. With a markup of about 17 percent, this sug-
gests a value of v = 0.25.
& We set 8 = 0.025 so that 2.5 percent of the capital stock depreciates each
quarter. This value is widely used in the literature.
y/: We set the capital adjustment cost parameter, y/ = 8.0, in order to match
the relative volatilities of investment and output as closely to the data as
possible.
p: We set the discount factor, fi = 0.99.
X'. The reciprocal of the Frisch (or constant Af) elasticity of labor supply. Empir-
ical estimates of the Frisch elasticity range from 0.05 to 0.35. So, our benchmark
specification -\/%= 0.33—is quite conservative for the purposes of our welfare
analysis.Comment
Gauti B. Eggertsson, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
1. Introduction
Since the formation of the European Monetary Union several coun-
tries have been left with little but fiscal policy to react to country spe-
cific business cycles. The right fiscal policy has thus become of central
importance for stabilization policy in Europe. This paper by Canzo-
neri, Cumby, and Diba (CCD) on the interaction of monetary and fiscal
policy in the EMU is therefore of great practical relevance in Europe
today. Somewhat surprisingly relatively few papers have been written
about this topic. This paper thus marks the beginning of a new research
agenda. And it is an excellent starting point.
The paper explores a sophisticated stochastic general equilibrium
model with sticky prices and wages and endogenous capital. The
model includes a role for both monetary and fiscal policy. Monetary
policy works through nominal interest rates and fiscal policy through
distortionary taxes and spending. While monetary policy is set by a
common monetary policy—and thus exogenously given from the per-
spective of a particular country—each country can determine its own
fiscal policy. The model in this paper is rich and ambitious and solving
it is a contribution in itself. One of the most interesting results of the
paper is the estimated welfare cost of giving up independent monetary
policy for a "small country." This cost is estimated to be on the order
of 1-3 percent in terms of period consumption. This is a surprisingly
large number and an important contribution to the literature that will
no doubt be debated in the future. Lucas' famous argument is that the
welfare cost of business cycles is trivial under complete markets.
1 This
has led some to dismiss the business cycle as a worthwhile topic of
study. CCD have now given us an example that shows the costs of busi-
ness cycles can be large in models with realistic nominal and real fric-Comment 301
tions. This result makes clear that the stakes are high for fiscal policy in
the EMU. It indicates that the proper choice of fiscal policy is of great
practical importance for countries without an independent monetary
policy to counteract the business cycle.
Rather than reemphasizing all the interesting results of this paper I
focus my discussion around three results with which I disagree some-
what. 1. For a country to satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—
which mandated limits on budget deficits and debt—the authors find
that making real wage taxes respond to deficit is harmful, whereas
decreasing government spending in response to deficits can increase
welfare. The authors suggest that the wage tax rule performs so badly
because it violates standard "tax smoothing principles." 2. The authors
ask whether fiscal policy is an important source of divergence in the
inflation rate across countries. Their answer is no. 3. The authors evalu-
ate the welfare effect of monetary policy that responds imperfectly to
domestic conditions and estimate it to be high as discussed above. The
key source of fluctuations is productivity shocks, which explains about
80 percent of the business cycle in their simulation.
I first review the CCD model and simplify it to emphasize some
aspects of the results. I start with discussing results 1 and 2.1 compare
the authors' policy rules to the Ramsey/optimal commitment alloca-
tion in a simplified version of their model. In contrast to the authors'
suggestion I find that the optimal allocation is that taxes should NOT
be smoothed over the business cycle—rather they should be changed so
that the "target level of real interest rate"—i.e., the real interest rate that
is consistent with market clearing and zero inflation—perfectly tracks
the nominal interest rate (which is exogenously given by the common
monetary policy). This is an interesting parallel to Woodford's (2003)
well known "Wicksellian" result that the nominal interest rate should
track to the target real rate of interest (which is exogenously given in
his model). In my illustration, in contrast to Woodford (2003), it is fiscal
policy that can achieve the Wicksellian equilibrium, but not by moving
the nominal interest rate (which is exogenously given by the common
monetary policy) but by using fiscal instruments to make the target
real rate of interest rate track the nominal interest rate. I show that a
properly conducted fiscal policy can completely stabilize inflation and
the output gap in the simplified framework. This casts new light on
the authors' second result, and I reach an opposite conclusion to the
authors' suggestion that fiscal policy is not important to explain the
divergence of inflation rates across countries in the EMU. My results302 Eggertsson
suggest that the divergence in the inflation rates across EMU countries
is a measure of the failure of fiscal policy to achieve the optimal alloca-
tion. Turning to result 1 I speculate that the emphasis the authors put
on productivity shocks may be problematic and argue that other shocks
could be more relevant over the business cycle. I suggest that the omis-
sion of these shocks may explain some of the anomalies reported.
1.1 The (Simplified) CCD Framework
The CCD paper starts from the premise that ECB policy can be charac-
terized by a simple policy function
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate and 7iEMUt is inflation in
EMU. Inflation is imperfectly correlated across countries so that
7tc,..,. = 9 K .+ £ , EMU,t c c,t ic,t
where /r t is inflation in a particular country and ejc t is noise. Then the
monetary policy rule from the perspective of each country is:
it=T+eec7rct+eeicJ (i)
Divergence of inflation across countries creates noise in the policy rule
for each country. This simple framework illustrates two costs of adopt-
ing the EURO. First, monetary policy may not respond optimally to
domestic inflation, i.e., even if the coefficient 0 is set optimally from
an ECB perspective the coefficient 09c may not be optimal from each
country's standpoint. If there are strong inflationary pressures in Italy,
for example, ECB may not react very strongly if prices are stable else-
where. Second, imperfect correlation of inflation rates across countries
introduces noise in the policy rule for each country. Interest rates may
rise in Italy, for example, because of price developments in Germany
that have nothing to do with monetary conditions in Italy. This is a
clever and interesting way of capturing the cost of the EURO from the
perspective of each member country.
2 One of the key findings of the
paper is that the costs of giving up independent monetary policy are
considerable. To see this one can compare welfare for a "large" country
to a "small" country. These welfare costs are of the order of 1-3 percent
of consumption. This cost is staggering as discussed in the introduction
and one of the most interesting results of the paper.Comment 303
I find it useful to simplify the CCD model to put more structure on
some of my comments. By doing so I am not pretending that all the
richness of the paper is preserved. I abstract from capital accumulation
and wage stickiness so that I can simplify the model and obtain only a
few equations by log-linearization. The resulting model is, apart from
some key additional elements, mostly standard in the literature and is
for example explained in detail in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and
Woodford (2003). The difference between this model and the standard
one is that distortionary taxes also enter the equilibrium relationships.
In this simplified version of CCD model the Euler Equation of the rep-
resentative household can be summarized by the IS equation:
xt = EtxM-a[it-Et7iM-r*] (2)
where 7tt = log(Pf/PM) is inflation and xt = Yt- Y* is the output gap, i.e., the difference between output, Yt - log Yf/Y, and the welfare relevant
measure of an output target Y* defined as
t=—T—r(&+G»)+—^rfc
CO + <7 CO + G
where G( = log GJY is real government spending, at is a productivity
shock and gt is a preference shock. The term f*t is the target real interest
rate that corresponds to this definition of the target level of output, i.e.,
it is the real interest rate that would be consistent with zero inflation
and a zero output gap, i.e., it is the interest rate that would "clear the





c = log(l + tf/1 + f
c) is a tax on consumption expenditures.
3
By varying consumption taxes (or government spending) the govern-
ment changes the price of consumption today relative to tomorrow and
can influence aggregate demand in that way. A temporary cut in the
consumption tax, for example, makes consumption today more attrac-
tive and thus increases demand so that the market clearing interest
rate is higher in equilibrium. Similarly a temporary increase in govern-
ment spending increases demand today relative to tomorrow and also
increases the target level of real interest rate. Since the output gap is304 Eggertsson
determined by the difference between the nominal and the target rate of
real interest both tax cuts and government spending result in a positive
output gap—unless monetary policy responds aggressively to offset it.
The other key equation of the model is the Euler Equation of the firm
or the AS equation. It can be summarized by the linear approximation
nt - Kxt + Ky{x™ +r
c,) + PEt7it+1 (4)
where rt
w = log(l + rt
w/l + f
w) is the tax on labor income. According to
this equation, as is standard in the literature, inflation depends on the
output gap and expectations about future inflation. In addition distor-
tionary taxes can create inflationary pressures. The reason is straight-
forward. An increase in either tax—other things constant—reduces the
supply of labor by the representative household. This in turn increases
the real wage demanded and thus the marginal cost of firms thereby
creating inflationary pressures.
In the case of distortionary taxes the budget constraint may also be
relevant for the equilibrium allocation. In the simplest case of zero
steady state debt the budget constraint can be linearized to yield
t — p L^t-l + *-Jf ~ -1 f ~ * -»f ~Tt ~ CXTt — (XT lt {D)
where Tt is lump sum taxes, Df is one period nominal debt, and a is
labor share in the production function. There is also a transversality
condition that rules out Ponzi schemes. Finally the monetary policy
rule (1) can be summarized as
I, =(f)K7tt+ £f
M. (6)
For a given path of the exogenous disturbances {gt, qt, ef) and the policy
instruments {rt
c, rt
w, Gt, Tt} a rational expectation equilibrium is a set of
stochastic processes for \xt, nt, it, Yt, Dt} that satisfy equations (2)-(6).
By what criterion should one evaluate what is the best path feasible
equilibrium allocation? The most natural criterion, and the one used by
CCD, is the utility of the representative household. One may approxi-
mate welfare by a second order expansion of utility of the representa-
tive household to yield
4
Tt +AxXt + AG{L.t-Ljt) \ (/)
where G* is the target level of government spending. This objective
says that ideally the government would set the output gap and infla-
tion equal to zero at all times and keep real government spending equalComment 305
to its target level. The success of any policy depends on how close this
objective is set to zero. Note that the distortionary taxes r
ct and z
wt do not
enter the objective directly. This indicates that these taxes only result in
welfare losses to the extent that they prevent the output gap and infla-
tion to be stabilized and if they limit the government's ability to keep
government spending at its target.
2. The Optimal Policy: Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Coordination
To understand the role of taxes in the model, and CCD's policy rules,
it is useful to study the best solution achievable. If the government can
finance its spending by lump sum taxation the budget constraint (5)
imposes no restrictions on the set of feasible outcomes. Then optimal
solution can be derived by solving a linear-quadratic Lagrangian prob-
lem:
-xM + oftff, - onM - or] + a(r
ct -T(
C+1 )- —^— (G, -GM
+ ft,[ff,-JOf,-l
This minimization problem yields the first order conditions:
& • • o-i = nt+ o0ff0lf - p~ oft,.! + ft, - 02(_! =0
— = xt + ft, - /3-
1ftf_1 - wft, = 0
— = O~ft, - p Oft,_j + KT//ft, = 0
3L • =o306 Eggertsson
Suppose that the shocks at and qt follow an AR(l)process with correla-
tion p but that G *= 0 at all times. Then one can show that a solution that
satisfies all the first order conditions and the equilibrium constraints is
Gt=G't=Q
This solution shows that optimal fiscal policy stabilizes both inflation
and the output gap. The optimal solution also violates tax smoothing.
This indicates that in the class of models studied in CCD tax volatility
will increase welfare if properly done, contrary to Barro's classic tax
smoothing result. The logic of the result can be seen from the second
order expansion of the representative household utility (7). Taxes only
cause welfare losses if they cause output to deviate from its efficient
level, positive inflation or public consumption to deviate from its tar-
get. In contrast Barro (1979) assumes an ad hoc quadratic objective in
taxes that implies—by assumption—that there is welfare cost of any
tax variations. In the model outlined here the government uses taxes
to ensure that the target level of real interest rate tracks the nominal
interest rate at all times. This guarantees that the output gap and the
inflation rate stay at zero but requires volatility in the tax rates.
To illustrate the optimal solution let us consider the effect of a positive
productivity shock in the model, which is the main driving force in the
CCD calibration. Figure 1 shows the solution of the model to a nega-
tive productivity shock when the fiscal instruments are held constant.
A negative productivity shock increases the target level of real interest
rate. This results in a positive output gap and inflation. The reason is
the wedge between the target level of real interest rate and the nominal
interest rate in the IS equation. Since monetary policy is set by ECB—and
thus outside the scope of the government—this gap cannot be bridged
by monetary policy. Thus the government cannot follow the Wicksell-
ian policy proposed by Woodford (2003), which mandates that monetaryComment 307
productivity shock the target level of real interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
the actual and the target level of output
10 15 20
Figure 1
The equilibrium when fiscal policy is held constant
policy should set the nominal interest rate to equal the target level of real
interest rate. Even if the government cannot change the nominal interest
rate, however, it can directly influence the target level of real interest rate
by fiscal policy. The solution above indicates that rather than using mon-
etary policy to make the nominal interest rate track the target level of real
interest rate the government should use fiscal policy to make the target
level of real interest rate track the nominal interest rate.
How is this policy achieved? This is shown in Figure 2. As illustrated
in Figure 1 a positive productivity shock increases the target level of real
interest rate. To offset this the government can raise the consumption
tax rate, as shown in Figure 2, and thereby neutralizing the effect pro-
ductivity has on the target level of real interest rate. The consumption
tax increase, however, creates a cost-push shock, since each household
wants to work less for a given real wage, resulting in higher marginal
costs for firm—holding other things constant. This can be seen by the
AS equation (4). To offset this cost push shock the government could
cut its labor tax rate.308 Eggertsson




The equilibrium under optimal fiscal policy
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the target level of real interest rate
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The government's response to a monetary policy shock could be
guided by a similar Wicksellian principle. In that case, however, the
effect of the shock is to change the nominal interest rate. To offset this
change, the government could vary consumption and labor taxes so
that the target level of real interest rate changes correspondingly—
while neutralizing the cost-push effect of the consumption tax in the
AS equation by changing labor taxes.
What is the role of real government spending in the optimal alloca-
tion? The answer is: Not much. Ideally the government would focus on
setting real government spending so that the marginal utility of public
consumption is equal to the marginal utility of private consumption.
Government consumption would only vary to the extent that shocks
shift those marginal utilities. If government spending does not enter
utility (as in CCD) they could be set at zero at all times. It is useful to
note, however, that government spending can also be used to stabilizeComment 309
inflation and the output gap. It is easy to verify, for example, that the








Figure 3 shows the equilibrium in this case. The government reacts
to a negative productivity shock by cutting government spending.
This neutralized the effect of productivity on the target level of real
interest rate, so that inflation and the output gap stay at zero. This
productivity shock Government spending
-5 0 10 15 20
the target level of real interest rate
-0.5
consumption tax, wage tax,
output and inflation
Figure 3
The equilibrium when government spending is used to stabilize inflation and the output310 Eggertsson
solution, however, is inferior to the optimal commitment solution. The
reason is that although inflation and the output gap stay at zero, gov-
ernment spending deviates from its efficient level.
3. Should the Government Cut Spending in Response to Budget
Surpluses?
A key question the authors address is how fiscal policy should be used
to stabilize the government budget. The motivation for this question is
that in the absence of "fiscal rules" in EMU, fiscal policy may become
"irresponsible." Irresponsible fiscal policy could, for example, lead
high debt countries to bully the ECB into inflationary policies in order
to inflate away their nominal debts. Taking the need for fiscal responsi-
bility as given the authors ask how it can best be achieved. They find a
surprising and interesting result: It enhances welfare to make real gov-
ernment spending react aggressively to budget deficits. In particular
the government could cut government spending when there is a bud-
get deficit and raise spending when there are surpluses. In contrast,
making the wage taxes respond to budget deficits reduces welfare.
The analytical results from the last section are helpful to interpret
CCD results. The policy rules they suggest can be written in a linear-
ized form as:
where St = log(Sf/Y) is the budget surplus. These rules say that the gov-
ernment should allow each of the variables to respond to budget defi-
cits. The key motivation for the policy rules the authors consider is the
Stability and Growth Pact, so that they are interested in rules that make
taxes increase in a response to deficits or government spending fall.
But alternative interpretations are possible. Giannoni and Woodford
(2003) suggest that a "robust" policy rule should involve a mappingComment 311
between endogenous variables and the policy instrument but should
not depend on any particular shocks. The rules suggested by CCD can
also be considered as special examples of "robust" rules that specify
that the policy variables should only depend on easily observed vari-
ables (the budget surplus in this case).
On the one hand the above rules are a simplified version of CCD's
rules, since I linearize around zero debt and zero surpluses, and abstract
from the informational delay they assume (so that EM does not appear
in front of St in the rule above). On the other hand they are more general
because I assume that the consumption tax can also respond to bud-
get deficits and do not impose any sign restrictions on the coefficients.
What is the optimal set of rules in this framework? To answer this ques-
tion let us suppose that the only shock is the shock to productivity. This
is not a bad approximation to their model since productivity shocks
explain about 80 percent of the variations in most variables. The answer
to this question is somewhat surprising. It can be shown that a rule
that fully implements the optimal equilibrium illustrated above is one
which has the coefficients
at
0) - (1 - a)]-
1
These equations reveal that the fully optimal rule takes the same form
as suggested by CCD when productivity shocks are the only source of
uncertainty. When t,c < 0 and %w > 0 this result indicates that the govern-
ment might increase consumption taxes in a response to budget deficit
and cut them them in response to budget deficits. The wage tax moves
in the opposite direction. Government spending, on the other hand,
could be kept at constant at all times.
There are some important differences between the optimal rule and
the rules studied by CCD. They calculate the welfare implication of a
rule that makes the wage taxes increase in a response to deficits (while
holding the consumption tax constant) and compare it to a rule where
real government spending is reduced in response to budget deficits.
They find that between these two alternatives the rule that makes gov-
ernment spending respond to budget deficits is better, and may even
increase welfare.312 Eggertsson
How does CCD's experiment relate to the optimal rule? The opti-
mal rule suggests that labor and consumption taxes should be moved
simultaneously in a response to budget surpluses. This is a key reason
for why they find little room for using distortionary taxes for economic
stabilization. Their results, therefore, do not imply that it is bad to vary
distortionary taxes for the standard Barro tax smoothing reasons. In
this model it is optimal to change distortionary taxes—but only as long
as it is done in the correct way!
As noted above the authors suggest that it may be useful to make
government spending respond to budget surpluses. This is one of the
most interesting results in the paper. To understand this result it is use-
ful to recall from the last section that government spending can indeed
by used to eliminate inflation and the output gap. It can be verified that
a rule that implements the equilibrium (8)—(11) is given by:
£G = 1 + o(f + at") > 0
A rule of this form may be better than nothing since it stabilizes both
inflation and the output gap. It is not optimal, however, since ideally
real government spending would only be aimed at equating the mar-
ginal utility of private and public consumption, while using the other
fiscal instrument to do the rest. If there are some constraints or costs
on moving consumption and wage taxes that are not as severe for gov-
ernment spending, a rule of this sort may be better than no rule at all.
Given the stakes illustrated by CCD's welfare calculations there is no
doubt that more research will be done to address this issue.
4. Is Fiscal Policy a Source of Inflation Divergence in EMU?
To address this question the authors analyze a model that has empiri-
cally estimated policy rules and ask the question: What fraction of the
variance of inflation can be explained by fiscal policy shocks? One
problem with this approach is that this variance decomposition only
answers the degree to which unforcastable movements in the fiscal vari-
able contribute to the inflation divergence (while assuming that they
are uncorrelated with other shocks). This does not give a full answer to
whether fiscal policy is responsible for the inflation divergence because
it says nothing about whether the systematic component of fiscal policy
has had any effect—positive or negative. If there are no unforcastableComment 313
shocks in the fiscal rules this would imply that fiscal policy is irrelevant
according to this criterion. But this would be a little bit misleading,
since the systematic component of fiscal policy may have large effects
on inflation variability. To see this one could rephrase the question of
this section by: Can fiscal policy stabilize inflation across countries?
The answer to this question is yes—even if it has not been successful
in doing so to date. The Wicksellian fiscal policy outlined in the last
sections completely stabilizes inflation divergence across countries in
EMU. In the model sketched out here inflation divergence is a sign of
that fiscal policy has failed and that all variations in inflation across
countries are due to badly designed fiscal rules.
Similar comment applies to the authors' analysis of the contribution
of fiscal shock to the variability of the debt to output ratio. The authors
find that fiscal shocks do not contribute much to the variability of this
measure leading the authors to conclude that "rules like SGP that try to
discipline fiscal policy by requiring the government to limit uncondi-
tional standard deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio seems rather perverse
in this context." But again this result only says what the unforcastable
component of the fiscal rule contributes to the variability of the debt-
to-GDP ratio. It gives little indication of the role of the systematic com-
ponent of the fiscal policy rules. If the systematic component implies
a balanced budget at all times and the initial level of debt is zero, for
example, this ratio would be zero at all times. Thus if the goal is to limit
the variability of debt to output, any deviation of this ratio from zero
would be due to a "failure" of the systematic component of the fiscal
rule that in principle could be eliminated it. Drawing conclusion from
simple variance composition of the unforcastable part of fiscal rules is
thus difficult.
5. Are Productivity Shocks the Most Important Driving Force
in the Business Cycle?
The first result of CCD summarized in the introduction of this com-
mentary a that productivity shocks are driving the business cycle. One
may even call this an assumption, since it is assumed that productivity
evolves in the same way as an estimated Solow residual. This assump-
tion is in line with a long tradition in the RBC literature. I think that it can
possibly raise some problems. The first is that it appears to imply—at
least in the stylized example I illustrate above—that the cost of business
cycle is somewhat awkward. If productivity shocks drive the business314 Eggertsson
cycle it appears it is costly because output moves too little. This is prob-
ably not what most policy makers have in mind. Most policy makers
worry about business cycles because output fluctuates too much and
creates involuntary movements in unemployment. The second prob-
lem with the heavy reliance on productivity shocks is related to a key
failure of the model that is carefully stressed by the authors in another
paper. They document that there is negative correlation between infla-
tion and output in their model simulation whereas this correlation is
positive in the data. My conjecture is that both these problems can be
solved by considering alternative shocks. I should note, however, that
this issue requires more careful study than the few preliminary conjec-
tures that I offer here.
To see the first problem consider a unit decrease in productivity
and suppose that this is an iid shock. What is the effect of this distur-
bance? A negative productivity shock causes the target level of output
to decrease. The effect on the other exogenous term, i.e., the target level
of real interest rate, is that it increases—because household wants to
spend more today relative to the future. One may then combine the IS
and the AS equation to yield:
* 1
xt=Yt-Yt=a rt >0 for rt < 0 (12) 1+cr^K-
This implies that output moves by more than the target level of output
under CCD's policy rule. We see that the cost of business cycles is that
output does not move enough. Figure 1 reveals that the same applies
for a simple AR(1) process for productivity. Again a productivity shock
is costly in the model because output does not move enough. Hence
one obtains the awkward conclusion that the main goal of stabilization
policy is to make output less stable. I suspect that the same result holds
in CCD. One indication of this is that CCD report an improvement in
welfare associated with the government spending rule even if output
and employment fluctuates more with the rule than without it in their
simulation.
Let us now turn to the second problem. To see why productivity
shocks results in a negative correlation between output and inflation
consider again a unit decrease in productivity and suppose that this is
an iid shock. Then we can write the AS equation as
Kt=KXt=KYt-KY* . (13)Comment 315
A decrease in productivity means that the target level of output
decreases, so that it works as a negative supply shock in the aggregate
supply equation. It increases marginal costs of firms since now they
have to employ more labor to produce a given quantity of output. One
can see by equation (13) that the shock can be offset by either a decrease
in current output or an increase in inflation. Both adjust in equilib-
rium and there is therefore a negative correlation between output and
inflation. This is more clear in Figure 1 where productivity follows an
These two problematic features of the model can be addressed by
considering different shocks such as a positive shock to the utility of
consumption, denoted by gt in equation (3). Consider first an iid shock
as before and note that a positive preference shock has the same effect
on the target level of real interest rate as the negative productivity
shock. Thus by equation (12) it increases the output gap. In contrast
to a negative productivity shock, however, the positive shock to pref-
erences increases the target level of output. Thus it acts as a positive
supply shock in equation (13) and thus induces a positive correlation
between output and inflation. Another interesting feature of this shock
is that output fluctuates more than the target level of output. In the
case of preference shocks, therefore, the cost of business cycles is that
output moves excessively. It would be interesting for future research on
the interaction of optimal monetary and fiscal policy to consider more
shocks than are reported in CCD. Assuming a more dominant role for
preference shocks would also be consistent with recent Bayesian esti-
mates of the importance of technology shocks such as those reported in
Smets and Wouters (2002) and Gali and Rabanal (2004).
6. Conclusion
It is hardly a criticism of the CCD paper to say that it is not the final
word on the interaction of monetary and fiscal coordination in EMU.
The points raised here are not a criticism but reflect my greed in
wanting even more than is already contained in this ambitious paper.
This paper, therefore, is more like the start of a research agenda rather
than the final word on this issue. And it is an excellent start. We have
much to look forward to from these authors and others in the field
as our understanding of the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy
improves.316 Eggertsson
Notes
1. Most recently put forward in Lucas (2003).
2. Although it is important to note that it assumes a structural relationship between the
inflation rates in each country. This relationship, however, will in general depend endog-
enously on the policy regime of each country. In this sense the analysis is only a "partial
equilibrium analysis" but the hope is that it captures some of the general issues at hand.
3. This corresponds to what Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) call an "American-style
sales tax" so that it does not enter the posted price of the sticky price of the firms.
4. I choose the steady state taxes so that I expand around the fully efficient steady state.
This means that there is no inflationary bias. In deriving this objective I've assumed that
public spending enters the utility of the household additively.
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1. Introduction
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (CCD) (2004) focused on a number of
important questions, all related to the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy in the Euro area.
The main question refers to the implications of asymmetries in the
monetary transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. The authors investi-
gate if the size of participant countries and the size of their government
debt create asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism, het-
erogeneity in the welfare effects of common monetary policy and dif-
ferent implications for fiscal policy.
CCD address these questions by using three different calibrations
of a single New Neoclassical Synthesis model with monetary and fis-
cal policy. Rather than modeling interactions between different type of
countries, the authors simulate the same model with different calibra-
tions aimed at mimicking an Average (small, low debt) Country, a high
Debt Country, and a Large Country.
The simulations of the different models show that:
• the common monetary policy has different effects between the Aver-
age country and the high Debt country because the latter's fiscal posi-
tion is more sensitive to changes in debt payments
• the effects differ between the average Country and the Large coun-
try because the latter's inflation rate is more highly correlated with the
Euro area inflation.
My discussion will concentrate on a single issue: is this a right model
of heterogeneity in EMU?318 Favero
2. The Sources of Heterogeneity in the CCD Model
There are two sources of heterogeneity in the model: the relation
between national and area wide inflation and fiscal rules.
The heterogeneity in the relation between national and area wide
inflation is supported by series of static OLS regressions (see Table 2 in
CCD) of aggregate inflation on national inflation:
The regressions, based on the samples 1995-2004, show a wide range
of slope coefficients. On the basis of this evidence the Average country
is calibrated by setting 0 to 0.4 (with a standard error of em t of 0,0028)
while the Large country is calibrated by setting 0 to 0.75 (with a stan-
dard error of enct of 0,002).
Fiscal rules generate difference between high debt and low debt
countries because there is evidence in the data that primary budget
surplus (in particular purchases and transfer) reacts to the level of the
debt. The response of the log of transfers to the lagged ratio of the debt
to GDP is calibrated to a common representative value of 0.1. Asymme-
tries between Average country and High Debt country are then gener-
ated by setting the initial values for the debt respectively at 70 percent
of GDP and 100 percent of GDP.
I shall discuss the authors' choices by concentrating on two issues:
calibration and specification. When considering calibration I shall not
discuss the choice of the sources of heterogeneity but I shall rather con-
centrate on the problems related to the measurement of the sources of
heterogeneity using the available data. Possible omitted sources of het-
erogeneity will then be analyzed under the heading of specification.
3. The Calibration of the Sources of Heterogeneity
3.1 Heterogeneity in the Relation between Euro Area Inflation and
Country Inflation
Figure 1 plots monthly observations on annual Consumer Price Index
inflation for Italy, Germany and the Euro area.
1
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the possibility of a structural break in the
relation between Euro area inflation and national inflation between the
pre-EMU and the EMU period. If this were the case, a calibration of
Large and Average country based on a static OLS regression fitted onComment 319
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Figure 1
Monthly observations of annual CPI inflation for Italy, Germany, and the Euro area
the sample 1995-2004 could potentially produce an observed heteroge-
neity, which was present in the pre-EMU regime but has disappeared in
the EMU regime. To further investigate this issue we have re-evaluated
the original evidence by running the same OLS regressions of CCD
using a rolling estimation with a fixed five-year window of observa-
tions for Italy and Germany. We report rolling estimates of 0. for Italy
and Germany along with the upper and lower bounds of their 95 per-
cent confidence intervals in Figures 2-3.
Figures 2-3 clearly illustrate the potential relevance of a structural
break in the relation between Euro area and national inflation between
the pre-EMU and EMU regimes. The rolling estimates of 0 show a
common tendency to increase over time towards a level that is not sta-
tistically different across countries and very close to one. If other EU
countries not considered here were to share the same pattern of coef-
ficients, then the relevance of the asymmetries in EMU generated by the
different responses of national inflation to area wide inflation would
be highly questionable. The possibility of a structural break overshad-
ows other potential problems of the CCD method of calibrating infla-320 Favero
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tion-related heterogeneity such as endogeneity in the regressors (which
should obviously differently affect large and small countries) and the
use of a static rather than a dynamic model for the relation between
national and Euro area inflation (a static model does not allow for het-
erogeneity in the short-run and long-run responses of the endogenous
variables to the regressors and leads to an estimate of the response that
is bound to lie between the two and gets closer to the long run response
the more persistent is the regressor; see for example Hendry, 1995).
3.2 The (lack of) Identification ofRicardian Fiscal Policy Rules
The second source of heterogeneity adopted by CCD depends on an
estimate of a fiscal rule which "insures that the government's present
value budget constraints hold by making the primary surplus react toComment 321
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the level of the debt." The estimated feedback parameter is then set
to its average value of 0.1. Unfortunately, as originally pointed out by
Cochrane (1998), Ricardian Fiscal Policy rules are not identified in the
specification proposed by the authors. To show the point, consider the
period-by-period government budget constraint:
(1)
where bt is the real debt to GDP ratio, dt is the real primary deficit to
GDP ratio, /is the (exogenous) growth rate of the economy and r is the
real interest rate (assumed constant for simplicity). Forward integration
of (1) yields:
(2)322 Favero
where £t{} is the mathematical expectations operator. Consider the case
in which the transversality condition is violated and
We have then
idM) (3)
where ft= (1 + y/1 + r).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the deficit follows an autore-
gressive process and therefore there is no feedback between deficit and
debt in the fiscal reaction function:
dt = pdtl+ut (4)
Substituting into (3) one obtains:
bt = b0-ydt (5)
where y/- 1 /1 — )S»p > 0. Yet nothing prevents from rewriting (5) as
df = #0-#t (6)
where 0 = yr
1, and the estimated relation between deficit and debt
would feature some feedback and be labeled as a stabilizing one.
In a recent paper Favero and Monacelli (2004) propose a solution
to the regime identification problem which could be useful to model
asymmetries in the EMU area.
The solution to the regime identification problem is based on the def-
inition of d*, the debt stabilizing primary deficit:
(1 + 7)
 w
Given sufficient variability in (r - >)/(l + f), the following rule
dt = pdt__1 + (l-p)d;+et (7)
is identifiable from an autoregressive rule and p < 1 ensures a debt-
stabilizing regime. In the case of EMU asymmetries in the fiscal posi-
tion could then be modeled by assuming a rule like (7) for countries
with a debt/GDP close to 60 percent and a more aggressive fiscal rules
for countries with a debt/GDP close to 100 percent.Comment 323
4. The Specification of the Sources of Heterogeneity
Our discussion of the previous section suggests a diminishing impor-
tance of the size related heterogeneity effect and leaves the public sector
budgets as the main source of heterogeneity in the EMU. Interestingly,
also the private sector balance sheets could generate heterogeneity. We
report in Tables 1 and 2 data on firms and households financing taken
from Favero and Giavazzi (2003).
Table 1
The structure of financing of non-financial companies. Bank borrowing as a percent of
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The Tables clearly show important differences in the structure of
firms and households financing across European countries that might
cause heterogeneity in the transmission of macroeconomic policies.
Importantly some of these asymmetries could be related to the "con-
sumption paradox" quoted by CCD in their conclusion. Gali, Lopez-
Salido and Valles (2003) show that the evidence on the positive effect
of government spending shock on consumption can be reconciled with
NNS models by introducing rule-of-thumb consumers.
2 The evidence
of Table 1 and Table 2 suggests that the importance of rule-of-thumb
consumers should be different across Europe and a natural source of
heterogeneity could then be the different weight of rule of thumb con-
sumers in different European countries (evidence of such heterogeneity
in the G5 countries has already been made available by Jappelli and
Pagano (1989) and Campbell-Mankiw (1995)).
5. Summary and Conclusions
Canzoneri et al. provide a novel contribution by integrating monetary
and fiscal policy in an NNS model and consider three different calibra-
tions to analyze the effect of heterogeneity in the Euro area. I posed
the question "is this the right model of heterogeneity in Europe?" My
answer is that the heterogeneity related to asymmetries in the responses
of national inflation to Euro-area inflation are less relevant after 1999,
that the heterogeneity related to differences in public sector balance
sheets are important and should be carefully modeled and that het-
erogeneity related to differences in household and firms balance sheets
should be introduced to obtain a closer relation between the simulated
economy and the Euro area.
Notes
1. The common source for all data is Datastream. CCD use quarterly rate of inflation
in their regressions. Our evidence is based on annual rates to avoid problems related to
filtering seasonally.
2. In fact, in a previous version of their paper, CCD explicitly considered a version of
their model with rule-of-thumb consumers homogeneously distributed in the Euro-area.
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